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Abstract
We consider two simple variants of a frame-
work for reasoning about knowledge amongst
communicating groups of players. Our goal
is to clarify the resulting epistemic issues.
In particular, we investigate what is the im-
pact of common knowledge of the underlying
hypergraph connecting the players, and un-
der what conditions common knowledge dis-
tributes over disjunction. We also obtain two
versions of the classic result that common
knowledge cannot be achieved in the absence
of a simultaneous event (here a message sent
to the whole group).
1 Introduction
We introduce a framework for reasoning about commu-
nication amongst groups of players. We assume that
each player is a member of a certain number of groups,
and that he is able to broadcast synchronously infor-
mation to each of those groups. Thus there is what we
call an interaction structure, a hypergraph of the
players, that determines the communication protocol.
We are interested in studying what players can learn
in certain restricted communication settings, what im-
pact common knowledge of the underlying hypergraph
can have, and in properties of the resulting knowledge
that can simplify reasoning about it.
For example, consider Figure 1. If player i knows that
he is in interaction structure (a), and he learns a fact
from player j that initially only player n knew, then
i can deduce that both l and k also must have learned
that fact. In interaction structure (b), he can only de-
duce that either of them has learned it, but not which
one. If i does not know the interaction structure, he
cannot draw such conclusions, since player n might as
well have communicated with player j directly. One
particular focus of our discussion concerns conditions
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Figure 1: Two interaction structures. Hyperarcs are
shown in gray.
under which knowledge of a disjunction does allow us
to deduce knowledge of one particular disjunct, thus
simplifying reasoning in such situations. Another fo-
cus is to analyze the conditions for attaining common
knowledge.
In the following Section 2, we first set up a more re-
stricted framework where players can only communi-
cate those facts that they initially know, and we ex-
amine this framework in detail in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4 we then lift this restriction and examine how the
properties of knowledge are affected when players are
allowed to send information which they learned from
other players. In Section 5 we discuss related work, in
particular two closely related frameworks from the lit-
erature, and draw some conclusions. We look at some
possible extensions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We assume the following setup to be common knowl-
edge among the players. There is a set of players N .
Each player i ∈ N has a private set Ati of facts (atomic
propositions), of which only player i initially knows
whether they are true. The truth values of these facts
are represented by a valuation, which can be written
as a set V ⊆ At containing those facts that are true,
where At =
⋃
i∈N Ati. By Vi, we denote V ∩ Ati, the
restriction of V to i’s facts.
Throughout, we assume communication to be truth-
ful in the sense that it only contains information the
sender knows to be true.
An interaction structure for players N is a tuple
(H, (Ati)i∈N ), where H is a hypergraph on N , i.e., a
set of non-empty subsets of N , called hyperarcs, and
the Ati are pairwise disjoint sets.
In the present section we place two restrictions, that
are related. Firstly, we use unordered sets of messages,
i.e. without any temporal structure, since it only mat-
ters whether a given message has been broadcast or
not, and not when it was broadcast. Secondly, we only
allow messages of the form (i, A, p) with i ∈ A ∈ H
and p ∈ Ati. That is, players only broadcast basic
facts that ‘belong’ to them. In Section 4 we partially
lift these restrictions, allowing more general forms of
broadcast. This in turn means introducing some tem-
poral ordering since if the message (i, A, p) occurs,
with p 6∈ Ati, then everybody in A knows that be-
fore that broadcast there was another broadcast of the
form (·, B, p) with i ∈ B, since otherwise i could not
have known p.
Given these restrictions, we consider two different sit-
uations: one in which the underlying hypergraph is
commonly known amongst the players; and one in
which it is not, in the sense that a player knows only
the hyperarcs to which he belongs.
In each case an interaction structure defines a com-
munication protocol: each player i can at any point
broadcast any true fact p ∈ Ati to any hyperarc A ∈ H
with i ∈ A. Thus a message is a tuple (i, A, p) with
i ∈ A and p ∈ Ati; (i, A, p) is the message in which
i communicates among the group A his fact p. H-
compliant messages are those in which A ∈ H. If
the players consider only H-compliant messages possi-
ble, then they know the underlying hypergraph H. So
if the model allows onlyH-compliant messages, the un-
derlying hypergraph H is common knowledge among
the players; if it uses all messages, H is unknown.
We next define our model formally in order to rea-
son about the knowledge of the players and how it
changes as messages are broadcast. This is roughly
along the lines of history based models (see, e.g., Pacuit
and Parikh (2007); Fagin et al. (1995)). We start by
defining a state, which we might also have called ‘pos-
sible world’, (V,M) to consist of a valuation V ⊆ At
and a set M of messages (·, ·, p) such that p ∈ V . An
H-compliant state is one where M only contains H-
compliant messages.
A word over a set A ⊆ N is a finite sequence w =
i1 . . . ik where each il ∈ A. By A∗ we denote the set
of all words over A, and we write Set(w) for the set of
players occurring in w.
Now given a set of messages M and a word w, we
introduce the following notation:
Mw := {(·, A, ·) ∈M | Set(w) ⊆ A}
Facts(M) := {p | (·, ·, p) ∈M}.
So Mi (respectively, Mw) is the subset of the set of
messages M that player i received (respectively, that
were broadcast to all the players in w; note that the
order in w does not matter), and Facts(M) is the set
of facts that were communicated in the messages in M .
In particular, Facts(Mi) is the set of facts that were
communicated in the messages in M that player i re-
ceived. Note that (V,M) is a state if Facts(M) ⊆ V .
Further, we define all set operations to act component-
wise on states, e.g. (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′) iff V ⊆ V ′ and
M ⊆M ′.
In order to represent the knowledge of the players
we define an indistinguishability relation between
states: (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) iff (Vi,Mi) = (V ′i ,M ′i).
In the semantics we present below, a player i is said
to ‘know’ a fact just if that fact is true in every state
that is indistinguishable for i from the actual state. Of
particular interest to us is the knowledge of groups G ⊆
N (always assumed to be non-empty). Specifically we
consider the so-called ‘common knowledge’ among a
group (cf. (Fagin et al., 1995, p. 23)). These are facts
that everybody in the group knows, they all know that
they know, etc. To define this formally we extend the
individual indistiguishability relation to groups: for
G ⊆ N the relation ∼G is the transitive closure of⋃
i∈G ∼i.
We are interested in properties definable by the follow-
ing epistemic language L:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | CGϕ,
where the atoms p denote the facts in At, ¬, ∧ and ∨
are the standard connectives; and CG is a knowledge
operator, with CGϕ meaning ϕ is common knowledge
among G. We write Ki for C{i}; Kiϕ can be read
‘i knows that ϕ’. The positive language L+ is the
sublanguage of L in which negation (¬) does not occur.
The semantics for L is as follows:
(V,M) H p iff p ∈ V,
(V,M) H ¬ϕ iff (V,M) 2H ϕ,
(V,M) H ϕ ∨ ψ iff (V,M) H ϕ or (V,M) H ψ,
(V,M) H ϕ ∧ ψ iff (V,M) H ϕ and (V,M) H ψ,
(V,M) H CGϕ iff (V ′,M ′) H ϕ
for each H-compliant (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′).
By allowing only H-compliant states in the last clause
of the semantics, the underlying hypergraph H is as-
sumed to be common knowledge. Assuming that the
hypergraph H is unknown turns out to be equivalent
to the case where it is common knowledge that the
hypergraph H is complete, i.e., H = P(N) − ∅. This
might seem counter-intuitive, but it reflects the fact
that if the hypergraph is unknown then every player
must consider it possible that every set A ⊆ N might
be a hyperarc in H. To denote the corresponding se-
mantics, we use  as abbreviation for H with H being
the complete hypergraph.
For a word w = i1 . . . ik, we write Kw to abbreviate
Ki1Ki2 . . .Kik , and write ∼w to denote the concate-
nation ∼i1 ◦ . . . ◦ ∼ik .
Notice that (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′) iff there is w ∈ G∗
with (V,M) ∼w (V ′,M ′). So an equivalent way of
specifying the semantics for CG with non-singleton G
is as follows:
(V,M)  CGϕ iff (V,M)  Kwϕ for all w ∈ G∗. (?)
We now study the consequences of two choices in the
analysis of players’ knowledge:
• The type of messages; we assumed already that
players send only atomic information, but there
still remains a choice whether, as assumed above,
players only send information they know ini-
tially, or can can send information that they have
learned from other players. The former scenario
is explored in Section 3, the latter in Section 4.
• The issue whether the underlying hypergraph is
commonly known among the players. We consider
this distinction in both of the following sections.
We shall see that both choices have bearing on players’
knowledge.
3 Telling
In this section we study the case under the assumption
mentioned above, that players’ messages refer only to
the facts they know initially. So players can send only
information they know at the outset. We call this con-
tingency ‘telling’.
For the relevance of common knowledge of H, consider
the following example.
Example 3.1. For players G = {i, j, k}, H = {G},
p ∈ Atk and (V,M) = (∅, ∅), we have
(V,M) H Ki¬Kjp.
Indeed, the only hyperarc in H through which player j
could learn anything from k is the one which also con-
tains player i. So there is no way for k to tell j any-
thing ‘secretly’. Hence, with Mi = ∅, i also knows
that Mjk = ∅. That is, in all states which i considers
possible at (V,M), k has not told j that p, therefore
in all these states j does not know p.
On the other hand, we have (V,M) 2 Ki¬Kjp, since
(V,M) ∼i ({p}, {(k, {j, k}, p)}).
So for some formulas, common knowledge of H mat-
ters. Note also that in this example, we even have
(V,M) H CG¬Kjp,
which shows that common knowledge can be attained
without any communication taking place.
However, common knowledge of formulas from the
positive language L+ can only be attained through
messages received by the whole group, and for these
formulas, common knowledge of H does not matter.
In order to establish this, we first show the following
Lemma 3.2, which intuitively says that if a positive
formula is true in some state, then it remains true in
any state where more facts are true or more communi-
cation has taken place. Remember that  corresponds
to H with H being the complete hypergraph, so the
following carries over to general states and .
Lemma 3.2. For any ϕ ∈ L+ and H-compliant states
(V,M) and (V ′,M ′) with (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′),
if (V,M) H ϕ, then (V ′,M ′) H ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. The
only not completely obvious case is when ϕ = CGψ
with ψ ∈ L+. We show the claim for G = {i}; the non-
singleton case then follows by induction and (?). Take
an H-compliant state (V ′′,M ′′) such that (V ′,M ′) ∼i
(V ′′,M ′′). Let
(V ′′′,M ′′′) := (Vi ∪
⋃
j 6=i V
′′
j ,Mi).
We have Facts(Mi) ⊆ Facts(M) ⊆ V , since (V,M) is
a state. Also, Mi ⊆M ′i = M ′′i ⊆M ′′, so Facts(Mi) ⊆
Facts(M ′′) ⊆ V ′′, since (V ′′,M ′′) is a state. Hence,
Facts(M ′′′) = Facts(Mi) ⊆ V ∩V ′′ =
⋃
i∈N (Vi∩V ′′i ) ⊆
V ′′′. This shows that (V ′′′,M ′′′) is a state. Moreover,
(V,M) ∼i (V ′′′,M ′′′). Assume now (V,M) H Kiψ.
Then we obtain (V ′′′,M ′′′) H ψ. Further, we have
(V ′′′,M ′′′) ⊆ (V ′′,M ′′) since Vi ⊆ V ′i = V ′′i and Mi ⊆
M ′i = M
′′
i due to (V
′,M ′) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′). Thus, by
induction hypothesis we obtain (V ′′,M ′′) H ψ.
Theorem 3.3. For any H-compliant state (V,M) and
ϕ ∈ L+,
(V,M)  ϕ iff (V,M) H ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction. The only
non-trivial step is when ϕ = CGψ with ψ ∈ L+.
(⇒) By induction hypothesis, (V,M)  CGψ implies
(V,M) H CGψ, since each H-compliant state is also
a state.
(⇐) Assume to the contrary that (V,M) 2 CGψ. So
there is a state (V ′,M ′) with (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′) and
(V ′,M ′) 2 ψ. Now let
M ′ H := {(·, A, ·) ∈M ′ | A ∈ H}.
So M ′ H consists of all H-compliant messages of
M ′. Now note that (V ′,M ′ H) ⊆ (V ′,M ′), so from
(V ′,M ′) 2 ψ we obtain that (V ′,M ′ H) 2 ψ us-
ing Lemma 3.2 (which, as noted, also holds for gen-
eral states and ). Since (V ′,M ′ H) is H-compliant,
the induction hypothesis yields (V ′,M ′ H) 2H ψ.
Moreover, we also have (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′ H), since
(V,M) is H-compliant and (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′). Thus,
(V,M) 2H CGψ.
In the remainder of this section, we are concerned with
formulas from L+, so in view of the above results we
restrict attention to .
We now establish that CG distributes over disjunctions
of positive formulas, starting with singleton G.
Lemma 3.4. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+, i ∈ N , and state
(V,M),
(V,M)  Ki(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M)  Kiϕ1 ∨Kiϕ2.
Proof. To deal with the (⇒) implication assume that
(V,M) 2 Kiϕ1 ∨ Kiϕ2. Then (V,M) 2 Kiϕ1 and
(V,M) 2 Kiϕ2, i.e., there are (V ′,M ′) and (V ′′,M ′′)
such that
(V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) and (V ′,M ′) 2 ϕ1, as well as
(V,M) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′) and (V ′′,M ′′) 2 ϕ2.
Let now
(V ′′′,M ′′′) := (Vi ∪
⋃
j 6=i(V
′
j ∩ V ′′j ),Mi).
Then Facts(M) ⊆ V , Facts(M ′) ⊆ V ′, Facts(M ′′) ⊆
V ′′, since (V,M), (V ′,M ′) and (V ′′,M ′′) are states.
Moreover, Mi = M ′i and Mi = M
′′
i . So,
Facts(M ′′′) ⊆ Facts(M) ∩ Facts(M ′) ∩ Facts(M ′′)
⊆ V ∩ V ′ ∩ V ′′
=
⋃
i∈N (Vi ∩ V ′i ∩ V ′′i )
⊆ V ′′′.
This shows that (V ′′′,M ′′′) is a state, and since M ′′′ =
Mi ⊆M it is H-compliant.
Now since Vi = V ′i = V
′′
i and Mi = M
′
i = M
′′
i , we have
(V ′′′,M ′′′) ⊆ (V ′,M ′) and (V ′′′,M ′′′) ⊆ (V ′′,M ′′).
By Lemma 3.2, we obtain (V ′′′,M ′′′) 2 ϕ1 and
(V ′′′,M ′′′) 2 ϕ2, thus (V ′′′,M ′′′) 2 ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. Further-
more (V,M) ∼i (V ′′′,M ′′′), so (V,M) 2 Ki(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
Further, the (⇐) implication immediately holds by the
semantics.
Theorem 3.5. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+, state (V,M),
and G ⊆ N ,
(V,M)  CG(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M)  CGϕ1 ∨ CGϕ2.
Proof. The claim follows directly from Lemma 3.4
and (?).
To see that this result does not hold if we allow
negation, consider three players i, j, k ∈ N , p ∈ Vk,
(V,M) = (∅, ∅), and ϕ = Ki(Kjp ∨ ¬Kjp). Then
(V,M)  ϕ, since the used disjunction is a tautology,
but there is no way for i to know which disjunct is
true.
Even with non-tautological disjunctions, the result
does not hold.
Example 3.6. With p ∈ Vk and
(V,M) = ({p}, {(k, {i, k}, p)})
ϕ = Ki(Kjp ∨ ¬(Kjp ∨Kj¬p)),
we have (V,M)  ϕ, but again, i knows neither dis-
junct in (V,M). Intuitively, having privately learned
that p is true, i knows that j either also learned it, or
that j doesn’t know whether p is true, but i does not
know which of these two statements is true.
Another observation is that mutual knowledge of any
fact p ∈ At can only be obtained through a corre-
sponding message, and is thus inseparably tied to com-
mon knowledge.
Lemma 3.7. For any w ∈ N∗ with |Set(w)| ≥ 2,
p ∈ At, and state (V,M), the following are equivalent:
(i) (V,M)  Kwp,
(ii) there is (·, ·, p) ∈Mw,
(iii) (V,M)  CGp with G = Set(w).
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii): Assume that (ii) does not hold. Let
V ′ := V \{p}. Then (V ′,Mw) is a state and (V ′,Mw) 2
p. Now let i ∈ N be such that p ∈ Ati. Since
|Set(w)| ≥ 2, there is j ∈ Set(w) with p 6∈ Atj . By
construction, (V ′,Mw) 2 p and (V,M) ∼j (V ′,Mw).
Since j ∈ Set(w) and both (V,M) ∼k (V,M) and
(V ′,Mw) ∼k (V ′,Mw) for all k ∈ N , we obtain
(V,M) ∼w (V ′,Mw) and thus (V,M) 2 Kwp.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Suppose that G = Set(w) and take m ∈
Mw. Consider (V ′,M ′) such that (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′).
This means that for a sequence i1, . . ., ik of players
from G and some states (V 1,M1), . . ., (V k,Mk) we
have (V,M) ∼i1 (V 1,M1) ∼i2 . . . ∼ik (V k,Mk),
where (V ′,M ′) = (V k,Mk). But i1 ∈ G, so m ∈Mi1 ,
and consequently m ∈M1i1 . Also i2 ∈ G, so m ∈M1i2 ,
and consequently m ∈ M2i2 . Continuing this way we
conclude that m ∈Mkik , that is m ∈M ′ik .
Hence, m ∈ M ′. This shows that Mw ⊆M ′. So
Facts(Mw)⊆ V ′, since (V ′,M ′) is a state. But by the
assumption p ∈ Facts(Mw), so (V ′,M ′)  p. This
proves (V,M)  CGp.
(iii)⇒ (i): By (?).
We can extend this connection between mutual and
common knowledge to arbitrary positive formulas.
Theorem 3.8. For any G ⊆ N , ϕ ∈ L+, and state
(V,M),
(V,M)  CGϕ iff (V,M)  Kwϕ for some w ∈ G∗
with Set(w) = G.
Proof. The direction (⇒) is by (?).
For (⇐), we proceed by structural induction. The base
case is obtained from Lemma 3.7. The induction step
for disjunction follows by Theorem 3.5, and for con-
junction it follows directly by definition of the seman-
tics. For ϕ = Kiψ, the assumption (V,M)  KwKiψ
yields, by induction hypothesis, that (V,M)  CG′ψ
for G′ = Set(w) ∪ {i} = G ∪ {i}, which by definition
of the semantics implies that (V,M)  CGKiψ.
Note that this result provides for positive formulas a
simplified characterization of the common knowledge
operator, as compared with (?).
Finally, we establish a result intuitively saying that a
group’s common knowledge of a positive formula can
only be achieved when some message (or messages) has
been broadcast to at least all members of this group.
So common knowledge of a positive formula cannot
be achieved among a group by means of more limited
communications, for example point-to-point messages.
Given a formula ϕ we denote by Facts(ϕ) the set of
facts that occur in it.
Theorem 3.9. For any G ⊆ N with |G| ≥ 2, ϕ ∈ L+,
and state (V,M),
if (V,M)  CGϕ, then there is (·, A, p) ∈M with
G ⊆ A and p ∈ Facts(ϕ).
Proof. By Theorem 3.5 and the definition of seman-
tics, we can transform CGϕ into an equivalent for-
mula consisting only of disjunctions and conjunc-
tions over formulas of the form CGCG1 . . . CGlp with
G1, . . . , Gl ⊆ N and p ∈ Facts(ϕ). Since (V,M) 
CGϕ there is at least one of these formulas for which
(V,M) |= CGCG1 . . . CGlp.
Take now w such that Set(w) = G. By (?) we ob-
tain (V,M)  KwCG1 . . . CGlp, so by the definition of
semantics (V,M)  Kwp. The claim now follows by
Lemma 3.7.
4 Forwarding
We now consider a more complex situation in which
players are allowed to send facts that they learned from
other players. We call this contingency ‘forwarding’.
It is achieved by relaxing in the definition of a message
(i, A, p) the assumption p ∈ Ati to p ∈ At. We still
insist that a player can send a message only to a group
to which he belongs, that is, that i ∈ A holds.
We also assume that only information known to be
true is sent, so we now need to examine how a player
learned the information he is sending. This brings us
to consider the following relation on the set of mes-
sages:
(j, B, p) (i, A, p) iff p 6∈ Ati and i ∈ B.
Intuitively, (j, B, p) (i, A, p) means that the fact p is
initially not known to player i and that he has learned
it from a message sent by player j to a group to which
i belongs. So (j, B, p)  (i, A, p) means that (j, B, p)
is a possible (partial) explanation of (i, A, p).
By a state we now mean a pair (V,M) such that for
each message (i, A, p) ∈ M a sequence of messages
(j1, B1, p), . . ., (jk, Bk, p) exists (i.e., each of these mes-
sages about p is in M) such that
• these messages form an explanatory chain: for l ∈
{1, . . ., k− 1} we have (jl, Bl, p) (jl+1, Bl+1, p);
• they are not circular: players j1, . . ., jk are all dif-
ferent;
• p is initially known to player j1: p ∈ Vj1 ; and
• the fact p reaches player i: (jk, Bk, p) = (i, A, p).
We call such a sequence of messages an explanation
for (i, A, p) in (V,M). So a pair (V,M) is a state if for
each of its messages it has an explanation.
Note that given a state, its messages contain only true
facts. That is, if (V,M) is a state, then Facts(M)⊆ V .
Moreover, if (i, A, p) ∈M , then player i knows that p is
true, i.e. (V,M)  Kip. (A more general statement is
established in Lemma 4.5.) Note also that when each
message in M is of the form (i, ·, p), where p ∈ Vi, then
(V,M) is a state, since each message then forms its
own explanation. So states considered in this section
generalize the states considered in the previous section.
Each state can be alternatively viewed as a partial or-
dering ∗ (where ∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure
of the  relation) on a set of messages such that each
message has an explanation.
The only restriction on the order of the actions comes
from the relation  that needs to be respected: a
player sends a message that contains information that
either he initially knows to be true (the message is
(i, A, p) where p ∈ Vi) or he has learned (the mes-
sage is (i, A, p) and some earlier message is of the form
(j, B, p), where i ∈ A). So the computation begins by
some players who send information they know is true.
We now consider the semantics introduced in Section 2
in this extended setting. It is important to realize that
these two semantics differ in the sense that for a state
and a formula ϕ ∈ L it can happen that (V,M) H ϕ
holds in the sense of Section 2 but not in the sense
considered now.
Example 4.1. Let N = {i, j, k}, H = {{i, j}, {j, k}},
V = {p}, where p ∈ Ati, and M = {(i, {i, j}, p)}.
Then we have
(V,M) H Ki¬Kkp
in the sense of Section 2. The intuitive reason is that
the fact p ‘belongs’ to i, so it cannot be used in any
message sent by j, and this information is known to
i. However, in the present setting p can be used in a
message sent by j and we have
(V,M) 2H Ki¬Kkp.
Indeed, consider (V ′,M ′) with V ′ = {p} and M ′ =
{(i, {i, j}, p), (j, {j, k}, p)}. Then (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′)
and (V ′,M ′)  Kkp.
In general, only non-epistemic formulas have the same
meaning w.r.t. both semantics.
We now show that some, though not all, properties
established in the previous section also hold in this
new setting. In particular, as in Example 3.1, we have
(∅, ∅) H CG¬Kjp, so also now common knowledge
can exist without any communication taking place.
However, as we shall see, Theorem 3.3 does not hold in
general any more. So in the following we usually con-
sider H , which, as mentioned earlier, includes  as a
special case with H being the complete hypergraph.
Recall that for a formula ϕ we denoted the set of facts
that occur in it by Facts(ϕ).
Lemma 4.2. For any ϕ ∈ L+ and H-compliant state
(V,M) if (V,M) H ϕ, then Facts(ϕ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. The
only not completely obvious case is when ϕ = CGψ.
But (V,M) H CGψ implies (V,M) H ψ, so in this
case the induction hypothesis readily applies, as well.
The following result is then a counterpart of Theo-
rem 3.9.
Theorem 4.3. For any G ⊆ N with |G| ≥ 2, ϕ ∈ L+,
and H-compliant state (V,M),
if (V,M) H CGϕ, then there is (·, A, p) ∈M with
G ⊆ A and p ∈ Facts(ϕ).
Proof. Note that the conclusion of the implication can
be written in a more succinct way as Facts(ϕ) ∩
Facts(
⋂
i∈GMi) 6= ∅. Suppose that (V,M) H CGϕ
and Facts(ϕ) ∩ Facts(⋂i∈GMi) = ∅. Call a message
a p-message if it is of the form (·, ·, p). Abbreviate⋃
i∈GMi to MG (Note that this is different from Mw,
where w is a word, which corresponds to an intersec-
tion.) Three cases arise.
Case 1. For all p ∈ Facts(ϕ) there is no p-message
in MG and Facts(ϕ) ∩ V = ∅. Then by Lemma 4.2
(V,M) 2H ϕ.
Case 2. For all p ∈ Facts(ϕ) there is no p-message in
MG and Facts(ϕ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Take some p ∈ Facts(ϕ) ∩ V . Since |G| ≥ 2, there is
i ∈ G such that p 6∈ Vi. Remove from V the fact p
and from M all p-messages. Denote the outcome by
(V ′,M ′). By construction (V ′,M ′) is an H-compliant
state and by the assumption there is no p-message in
Mi, so (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′).
Case 3. For some p ∈ Facts(ϕ) there is a p-message
in MG.
Given a set of messages O ⊆M , we denote by top(O)
the set of p-messages m ∈ O, where p ∈ Facts(ϕ), such
that for no m′ ∈ O we have m 6= m′ and m  ∗ m′.
Further, we define (cl stands for the closure)
cl(m) := {m′ ∈M | m ∗ m′}.
We assumed that the set of p-messages in MG, where
p ∈ Facts(ϕ), is non-empty, so the set top(MG) is non-
empty and hence for some i1 ∈ G the set top(MG)∩Mi1
is non-empty. Choose some m ∈ top(MG) ∩Mi1 . Let
M ′ := M \ cl(m) and V ′ := V . By the assumption
Facts(ϕ)∩Facts(⋂i∈GMi) = ∅, so there is some i ∈ G
such that i 6∈ A, where m is of the form (·, A, p) for
some p ∈ Facts(ϕ). By the construction (V ′,M ′) is
an H-compliant state and (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′).
We now repeat the above case analysis with (V ′,M ′)
instead of (V,M). Iterating this way we eventually end
up in Case 1 since in Cases 2 and 3 always some fact
or message is removed. This way we obtain a word
w ∈ G∗ and an H-compliant state (V ′′,M ′′) such that
(V,M) ∼w (V ′′,M ′′) and (V ′′,M ′′) 2H ϕ. By (?) this
contradicts the assumption that (V,M) H CGϕ.
Corollary 4.4. For any G ⊆ N with |G| ≥ 2, p ∈ At,
and H-compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H CGp iff there is (·, A, p) ∈M with G ⊆ A.
Proof. (⇒ ) is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.3.
(⇐ ) The proof is analogous to the one of the impli-
cation (ii)⇒ (iii) of Lemma 3.7 and is omitted.
Here is the counterpart of the above result for the case
of one player. It states that in any state a player knows
a fact iff either he knows it at the outset or he has
learned it through a message he received.
Lemma 4.5. For any i ∈ N , p ∈ At, and H-
compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H Kip iff p ∈ Vi ∪ Facts(Mi).
Proof. (⇒ ) Suppose that (V,M) H Kip and p 6∈ Vi∪
Facts(Mi). Remove from V the fact p and from M all
messages of the form (·, ·, p). Denote the outcome by
(V ′,M ′). By construction (V ′,M ′) is an H-compliant
state and by the assumption (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′). So
(V ′,M ′) H p, which is a contradiction.
(⇐ ) Consider an H-compliant state (V ′,M ′) such
that (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′). Then Vi = V ′i and Mi = M ′i .
So Vi ⊆ V ′ and Facts(Mi)⊆ Facts(M ′)⊆ V ′, where
the final inclusion follows by the fact that (V ′,M ′)
is a state. So p ∈ V ′ and consequently (V ′,M ′) H p,
as desired.
Corollary 4.6. For any i ∈ N , p ∈ At, and H-
compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H Kip iff (V,M)  Kip.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.5 and the fact that
 is a special case of H .
For further analysis we need an auxiliary concept.
Suppose that (V,M)⊆ (V ′,M ′), where (V ′,M ′) is a
state. In general, (V,M) does not need to be a state
but we can complete it to a state L(V,M) such that
L(V,M)⊆ (V ′,M ′). Indeed, it suffices for each mes-
sage m in M to add to M messages forming an ex-
planation of m in M ′ and then add to V the facts
used in these added messages. More precisely, let
M ′′ be a smallest set such that M ⊆M ′′ ⊆M ′ and
(V ∪ Facts(M ′′),M ′′) is a state. In general, this does
not define a unique state, since each message in M ′ can
have multiple explanations. However, the states are fi-
nite, so we can always choose (V ∪ Facts(M ′′),M ′′)
in a unique way, for example, by associating with each
state a unique natural number.
From now on we assume that given an inclusion
(V,M)⊆ (V ′,M ′) the state L(V,M) is uniquely de-
fined. Note that if (V ′,M ′) is H-compliant, then so
are (V,M) and L(V,M).
The following observation will be useful.
Fact 4.7. For any i ∈ N and H-compliant states
(V,M), (V ′,M ′) with (Vi,Mi)⊆ (V ′,M ′),
(V,M) ∼i L(Vi,Mi).
Proof. All messages in (Vi,Mi) involve player i, so
the H-compliant state (V ′′,M ′′) = L(Vi,Mi) is re-
alized by adding to (Vi,Mi) only some messages that
do not involve player i and some facts from outside of
Ati. Consequently Mi = M ′′i and Vi = V
′′
i , that is
(V,M) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′).
Next, the following property of the semantics will be
needed.
Lemma 4.8. For any H-compliant state (V,M),
G⊆N , and facts p1, . . ., pk,
(V,M) H CG(
∨k
j=1 pj) iff (V,M) H
∨k
j=1 CGpj.
Proof. To deal with (⇒) we consider two cases.
Case 1. |G| = 1, say G = {i}.
Suppose that (V,M) 2H
∨k
j=1Kipj . Then for j ∈
{1, . . ., k} we have (V,M) 2H Kipj and thus by
Lemma 4.5 pj 6∈ Vi ∪ Facts(Mi). Let
(V ′′,M ′′) := L(Vi,Mi)
be the H-compliant state defined w.r.t. the inclusion
(Vi,Mi)⊆ (V,M). This state is realized by adding to
Mi some messages from M and to Vi some facts from
Facts(Mi). So V ′′ ⊆ Vi ∪ Facts(Mi) and consequently
for j ∈ {1, . . ., k} we have pj 6∈ V ′′. Hence,
(V ′′,M ′′) 2H
∨k
j=1 pj .
Moreover, by Fact 4.7 we have (V,M) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′),
so (V,M) 2H Ki(
∨k
j=1 pj).
Case 2. |G| ≥ 2.
By Lemma 4.2 for some j ∈ {1, . . ., k} there is
(·, A, pj) ∈ M with G ⊆ A. So, by Corollary 4.4,
(V,M) H CGpj , and thus (V,M) H
∨k
j=1 CGpj .
l k j i
Figure 2: Knowledge of H matters even for positive
formulas when forwarding is allowed.
The (⇐) implication holds directly by the definition
of the semantics.
We can now resume our comparison with the results
of the previous section. To start with, the following
result is a counterpart of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 4.9. For any ϕ ∈ L+ and H-compliant states
(V,M) and (V ′,M ′) with (V ′,M ′) ⊆ (V,M),
if (V ′,M ′) H ϕ, then (V,M) H ϕ.
Proof. By structural induction on ϕ.
In Section 3 we used this result to establish Theo-
rem 3.3. However, in the current setting the coun-
terpart of Theorem 3.3 does not hold.
Example 4.10. Consider players N = {i, j, k, l} and
a graph H with the edges {l, k}, {k, j}, {j, i}, see Fig-
ure 2. Suppose that V = {p}, where p ∈ Atl, and
M = {(l, {l, k}, p), (k, {k, j}, p), (j, {j, i}, p)}. Then
(V,M) 2 KiKkp,
since player i does not know through which source
player j learned p. However,
(V,M) H KiKkp,
since when the underlying graph is commonly known,
player i knows that player j learned p from player k.
Still, a limited counterpart of Theorem 3.3 does hold.
Let L+K be the sublanguage of L+ in which the knowl-
edge operators CG are not allowed to be nested. So
if CGϕ ∈ L+K , then ϕ is a propositional formula that
does not use negation.
Theorem 4.11. For any H-compliant state (V,M)
and ϕ ∈ L+K ,
(V,M)  ϕ iff (V,M) H ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. The
only non-trivial case is when ϕ = CGψ for some i ∈ N
and ψ is a propositional formula that does not use
negation.
Let
∧k
j=1
∨mj
l=1 pj,l be the conjunctive normal form of
ψ. So each pj,l is a fact. By Lemma 4.8 and the
definition of semantics we have both
(V,M)  CGψ iff (V,M) 
∧k
j=1
∨mj
l=1 CGpj,l
and
(V,M) H CGψ iff (V,M) H
∧k
j=1
∨mj
l=1 CGpj,l.
But by Corollary 4.6, for all j ∈ {1, . . ., k} and l ∈
{1, . . .,mj} we have
(V,M)  CGpj,l iff (V,M) H CGpj,l.
This implies the claim for CGψ.
We now analyze to what extent Theorem 3.5 holds
in the current setting. We first prove that the CG
operator distributes over disjunctions of formulas from
the non-epistemic sublanguage L∧,∨ of L in which only
conjunction and disjunction is allowed.
Theorem 4.12. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L∧,∨, i ∈ N and
H-compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H CG(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M) H CGϕ1 ∨ CGϕ2.
Proof. Passing by the conjunctive normal forms of ϕ1
and ϕ2, the result follows from the definition of the
semantics and Lemma 4.8 twice.
However, the CG operator does not distribute over
the knowledge operators, so the counterpart of The-
orem 3.5 does not hold.
Example 4.13. Consider the set of players N =
{i, j, k, l, n} and the hypergraph H being the graph
with the edges (n, k), (n, l), (k, j), (l, j), (j, i), see Fig-
ure 1(b). Take V = {p}, where p ∈ Atn, and
M = {(n, {n, k}, p), (k, {k, j}, p), (j, {j, i}, p)}.
Then
(V,M) H Ki(Kkp ∨Klp),
but neither (V,M) H KiKkp, nor (V,M) H KiKkq
holds. Informally, player i knows that either player k
or player l knows p but he does not know which one
of them knows p.
As noticed already after the proof of Theorem 3.5, the
Ki operator does not distribute over negation either;
the same example applies here.
Finally, reconsider Theorem 3.8. It is straightforward
to see that it does not hold in the present setting, even
for two players. Indeed, reconsider Example 4.10. We
showed there that (V,M) H KiKkp. However, it is
easy to see that (V,M) 2H C{i,k}p since (V,M) 2H
KkKip.
5 Conclusions and related work
In this paper we studied various aspects of common
knowledge in two simple frameworks concerned with
synchronous communication. It is useful to clarify
that our two impossibility results concerning the at-
tainment of common knowledge amongst players (The-
orems 3.9 and 4.3) differ from the customary impossi-
bility results.
For example, Halpern and Moses (1990) formalize
the epistemic aspects of the celebrated Coordinated
Attack Problem that consists in achieving common
knowledge (a ‘common plan of action’). They show
(in Section 8) that in a distributed system in which
communication is not guaranteed, common knowledge
is not attainable. When communication is guaranteed,
they show the same result when there is no bound
on message delivery times. In both situations the
proof assumes the existence of clocks and point-to-
point communication.
The close correspondence between simultaneous events
(in our system a broadcast to the whole group) and
common knowledge is pointed out by Fagin et al.
(1999). Their model of a distributed system consists
of a set of linear ‘runs’ (histories), while we only as-
sume a partial ordering ( ) between messages broad-
cast to groups, which are the only possible actions. We
have shown that in our framework, common knowledge
of a positive formula is indeed inseparably related to
group communication, which corresponds to simulta-
neous events. However, as we have seen, this does
not hold of negative formulas, so the relationship is
not as obvious as it may seem. The results of Fagin
et al. (1999) may be seen to correspond to our Corol-
lary 4.4, though we allow broadcasts instead of just
point-to-point communication.
Chandy and Misra (1986) consider the flow of infor-
mation in distributed systems with asynchronous com-
munication. They study how processes ‘learn’ about
states of other processes and how knowledge evolves.
The main difference is that with asynchronous com-
munication, hypergraphs are equivalent to mere point-
to-point graphs. Without guarantees on the delivery
time, and without temporal reasoning, from the knowl-
edge point of view sending an asynchronous group mes-
sage has the same effect as sending a separate message
to each group member.
Our study concerning the consequences of the assump-
tion whether the underlying hypergraph is commonly
known among the players brings our paper somewhat
closer to the area of social networks (see, e.g., Jackson
(2008)). Within logic, the relevance of epistemic issues
in communication networks has been recognized by a
number of authors, e.g. van Benthem (2006). How-
ever, to our knowledge the only work that addresses
these issues is Pacuit and Parikh (2007) and, to some
extent, Roelofsen (2005). We now briefly discuss these
frameworks and relate them to our own.
Pacuit and Parikh (2007) use a history-based model
to study diffusion of information in a communication
graph, starting from facts initially known to individual
players. Communicative acts are assumed to consist in
a player j ‘reading’ an arbitrary propositional formula
from another player i, with the precondition that i
knows that the formula holds. Communicative acts
are restricted to a commonly known, static, directed
graph, and, unlike in our case, are assumed to go un-
noticed by i. The paper formalizes what conclusions,
beyond the mere factual content of messages, can be
drawn using knowledge of the communication graph
and, consequently, knowledge of the possible routes
along which certain information can have flown.
Roelofsen (2005) uses a model based on Dynamic Epis-
temic Logic (DEL) to describe how some initial epis-
temic model evolves in a communication situation.
Communication is among subgroups and can contain
arbitrary epistemic formulas. Further, communication
is assumed to be truthful and is restricted to occur
along a hypergraph. However the hypergraph is ex-
plicitly encoded in the model, and thus (knowledge of
it) is subject to change.
While under certain circumstances history-based mod-
eling and DEL are equivalent (van Benthem et al.,
2007), our approach is more in the spirit of Pacuit
and Parikh (2007). Indeed, we also study how specific
information may have spread. Also, all possible com-
munications are included in the model and suspicions
about them are not explicitly formed. Finally, the un-
derlying graph (in our case hypergraph) is static and
not included in the model.
On a technical level, our approach differs from Pacuit
and Parikh (2007) in that we use sets of messages in-
stead of sequences and, when dealing with forwarding,
employ a more general structure than histories by con-
sidering messages partially ordered by the relation  .
On the other hand, our messages are simpler: Pacuit
and Parikh (2007) allow disjunctions of facts, while we
allow only facts.
What distinguishes our approach on a more conceptual
level is that our focus lies on identifying natural con-
ditions that allow us to prove stronger results about
knowledge, such as distributivity over disjunctions, or
irrelevance of (common) knowledge of the underlying
hypergraph.
6 Extensions
We conclude by listing a number of natural extensions
of the considered framework that are worthy of further
study:
• We could equip the players with theories that
their parts of valuations, Vi, have to satisfy. In
this extension we would assume that each player
i has a propositional theory Ti built from facts
in Ati that he adheres to. The theories Ti where
i ∈ N then form a common knowledge among the
players. So each player j can assume that player
i considers Vi such that Vi is a model of Ti.
• We could consider more complex messages than
simple atomic facts, for example propositional
formulas, or even epistemic formulas. Also, we
could study asynchronous communication, mes-
sages from unknown senders or to an unknown
group of recipients, and a counterpart of the blind
copy feature familiar from e-mails.
• In Section 4 we relaxed the assumption that in a
message (i, A, p) it has to be the case that p ∈ Ati,
but we did still insist on the truthfulness of mes-
sages, requiring that p ∈ V . We could further re-
lax this assumption, by insisting only that p ∈ At.
This way we would model messages that consist
of possibly false (but credible) information. This
would lead to a study of beliefs (which can be
false) rather than knowledge (which cannot) and
common beliefs rather than common knowledge.
• We could consider in this framework belief revi-
sion, by assuming that the theory Ti of player i
consists of his beliefs, which would then be revised
in view of received information. Alternatively, Ti
could be the certain knowledge of player i against
which received information would be revised.
• We could assume that the players have different
knowledge of the underlying hypergraph, by as-
suming that for all i we have H ⊆Hi, where H is
the underlying hypergraph and Hi is its approx-
imation known to i, and that players learn H by
exchanging messages. The messages would con-
tain information about which hyperarcs do not
belong to H.
• Alternatively, we could study a setup in which
each player has an indistinguishability relation
over hypergraphs. This would allow us to model
players’ partial knowledge of the underlying hy-
pergraph.
We use the setting of the first item in (Apt et al.,
2009) to reason about iterated elimination of strate-
gies in strategic games with interaction struc-
tures. These are strategic games in which there is
a hypergraph over the set of players (an interaction
structure) and the players can communicate about
their preferences, initially only known to themselves,
so that within each hyperarc players can obtain com-
mon knowledge of each other’s preferences.
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